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9.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes retirement saving and portfolio choice in the United
States, Italy, and the Netherlands. In addition to relying on public retire-
ment provisions, households prepare for retirement through tax-sheltered
and after-tax savings. They may invest these funds in a wide variety of as-
sets, including housing, stocks, bonds, savings accounts, and so on. These
asset types diﬀer in their risk, return, and liquidity characteristics as well
as in their ﬁscal treatment. Economic theory postulates that households al-
locate their portfolios according to their risk aversion, time horizon, un-
certain out-of-pocket medical expenditures, income risk, informal (family)
risk-sharing arrangements, and more. While the literature has tested vari-
ous parts of the theory, both testing and quantiﬁcation of the theory are
hampered by the fact that some of the major variables do not exhibit suﬃ-
cient variation within a country to establish their relative importance for
portfolio choice, or, more generally, for retirement saving and investment.
This paper partially ﬁlls that gap by exploring three countries with widely
varying institutional arrangements for retirement income.
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Willis for her encouragement and support.Bertaut and Starr-McCluer 2000). Returns vary across asset types, so port-
folio composition has important implications for the pace of wealth accu-
mulation and the degree of retirement preparedness; risks vary across as-
set types, so portfolio composition has important implications for the
distribution of retirement income; portfolio decisions illuminate how tax
policy aﬀects household spending and saving; portfolio decisions illumi-
nate how macro variables (interest rates, stock prices, inﬂation, unemploy-
ment) aﬀect household spending and saving; also, understanding house-
holds’ portfolio decisions may provide deeper insight into theories of
consumption and saving behavior.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 9.2 poses a brief theoretical
framework. Section 9.3 highlights relevant aspects of the legal and insti-
tutional environments of the three countries under study. Section 9.4 de-
scribes the three countries’ microdata that we use. Section 9.5 draws to-
gether the theoretical framework and the institutional diﬀerences to
formulate four hypotheses about expected patterns in the microdata from
the diﬀerent countries. Section 9.6 presents the empirical analysis with
particular emphasis on section 9.5’s hypotheses. Section 9.7 concludes.
9.2 Theoretical Framework
Our point of departure to study retirement savings is the life-cycle hy-
pothesis (LCH) formulated by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). The ba-
sic tenet of the LCH is that rational consumers will try to smooth con-
sumption over the life cycle in such a way that the marginal utility of
consumption is equalized across periods. Since individuals usually have a
life-cycle income pattern that is inversely U-shaped (at young ages, earn-
ings are modest but grow until roughly retirement, after which income de-
clines), the life-cycle pattern of wealth is also inversely U-shaped. In its
simplest form, sometimes referred to as a “stripped-down” version
(Browning and Lusardi 1996), the LCH fails to explain several well-known
facts. Several extensions have therefore been introduced. These include the
incorporation of uncertainty, bequest motives, borrowing constraints, pre-
cautionary motives, transaction costs associated with the reshuﬄing of
portfolios, taxes, and lack of ﬁnancial sophistication. We draw on several
of these extensions below, insofar as they shed light on the portfolios of the
(near-)retired. Our interest is primarily in the implications of institutional
arrangements for individuals’ wealth accumulation and proﬁle.
9.3 Legal and Institutional Environments
Kapteyn and Panis (2002) provide a detailed discussion of legal issues
and institutional features that aﬀect retirement income in the United
States, Italy, and the Netherlands. This section highlights the features that
282 Arie Kapteyn and Constantijn Panisare relevant for our purposes. In separate subsections, we highlight the
three legs of the proverbial retirement income stool: social security, occu-
pational pensions, and private savings.1We then discuss capital market im-
perfections (transaction costs and liquidity constraints) and exposure to ﬁ-
nancial risks in retirement.
9.3.1 Social Security
In the United States, social security is mainly provided as Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI).2 It makes cash payments to retired workers,
spouses of retired workers, and widows and children of deceased workers.
A separate program, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), makes cash
payments to, among others, needy elderly. The Italian social security pro-
gram, Programma Nazionale di Sicurezza Sociale, makes cash payments
to retired workers and widow(er)s of deceased workers; it also guarantees
a minimum beneﬁt for the poor. The Italian program does not have a
spousal beneﬁt. In the Netherlands, cash payments are made to elderly in-
dividuals—regardless of their work history—on the basis of the General
Old-Age Act (Algemene Ouderdoms Wet [AOW]). We use the term “social
security” to refer to all programs that pay cash beneﬁts to the elderly, re-
gardless of whether the entitlement originates from contributive insurance
or social assistance.
All three social security programs are predominantly funded on a pay-
as-you-go basis. The United States maintains a buﬀer in the form of an
OASI trust fund. There is no trust fund in Italy. Italian social security out-
lays currently exceed contributions by about 8–17 percent of payroll (Bru-
giavini 1999); the diﬀerence is funded from general tax revenues. The
Netherlands instituted a trust fund in 1996.
In all three countries, participation in social security is mandatory, and
coverage is nearly universal. Almost all elderly are eligible to receive some
beneﬁts.
Table 9.1 gives an indication of the generosity of social security in the
three countries. The ﬁrst column shows social security expenditures as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Italy spent approximately
15.7 percent of GDP on social security in 1999, far higher than the United
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1. Laws and institutions are changing continuously. As a general rule, we describe the sta-
tus around the time of our household surveys, that is, from roughly 1995 to 1999, and note
major changes over time only where relevant. All amounts are in 1998 currencies, unless
stated otherwise. We converted all amounts in Dutch guilders (NLG) or Italian liras (ITL)
into euros (€) at the exchange rates that were irrevocably ﬁxed at the euro’s conceptual intro-
duction in the beginning of 1999: €1   NLG 2.20371   ITL 1936.27. On 1 January 1999 the
exchange rate of the euro and the U.S. dollar was $1  €0.857. The dollar exceeded parity with
the euro for several years but had returned to its initial level of $1   €0.857 by June of 2003.
For purposes of comparing purchasing power, an exchange rate of one to one is probably a
reasonable approximation.
2. Unless noted otherwise, our discussion does not extend to public support for the disabled
and their dependents.States (3.9 percent in 2000) and the Netherlands (5.0 percent in 1999). This
is in minor part explained by the age structure of its population. The sec-
ond column shows the elderly dependency ratio, that is, the size of the pop-
ulation that is at least sixty-ﬁve years old as a fraction of the working-age
population. Italy again tops the list, but the diﬀerences are not large.3 The
third column shows the ratio of social security outlays as a fraction of GDP
and the dependency ratio. It may be interpreted as a measure of the gen-
erosity of each country’s social security program. Italy remains far above
the other two countries. This is largely because occupational pensions,
which play a signiﬁcant role in the United States and the Netherlands, are
negligible in Italy—see below. In addition, until recently, early retirement
was very widespread in Italy, especially in the public sector. Several cate-
gories of public employees could retire after ﬁfteen to twenty years of con-
tributions. Early retirement essentially increases the dependency ratio.
Social security beneﬁts are paid in the form of a lifelong annuity in all
three countries.
In the United States, OASI beneﬁts are a function of historical earnings,
retirement age, and marital status. They may be claimed at age sixty-two;
delayed claiming results in higher beneﬁts according to a schedule that is
roughly actuarially fair. In 2001, average retired worker beneﬁts were $845
per month. Aged couples received an average of $1,410 per month, and
single elderly widow(er)s $811. Beneﬁts are adjusted annually for inﬂation.
The replacement rate for unmarried individuals with average wages was
approximately 44 percent. The nationwide average replacement rate, in-
cluding spousal and other derived beneﬁts, was approximately 56 percent
in 1995 (Blöndal and Scarpetta 1998). There is no minimum OASI beneﬁt.
However, regardless of their earnings history, elderly individuals (and cou-
ples) are eligible for a monthly SSI beneﬁt of $530 ($796 for couples).
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Table 9.1 Social security outlays and dependency ratios
(1) (2)
Social security  Population age 65 
outlays as percentage  as percentage of population  Ratio of 
of GDP (1999) age 25–64 (1994) (1) and (2)
United States 3.9 24.8 0.156
Italy 15.7 29.6 0.523
The Netherlands 5.0 24.4 0.208
Sources: Board of OASI Trustees (2001); Social Security Administration (2000); Franco
(2000); Kapteyn and De Vos (1999); Bureau of the Census (2001).
3. Italy’s fertility rate was very low during the 1990s, well below the replacement level. While
the dependence ratio is only somewhat larger in Italy than in the United States and the
Netherlands, the diﬀerence is expected to increase markedly in the future.In Italy, private-sector workers may retire with full beneﬁts at age sixty
(men) or ﬁfty-ﬁve (women) or after thirty-ﬁve years of social security tax
payments, whichever is earlier.4 For public-sector employees, only twenty
(men) or ﬁfteen (women) years of tax payments are required. Beneﬁts are
a function of number of years worked and so-called pensionable earnings.
For private-sector employees, pensionable earnings are equal to the aver-
age earnings of the last ﬁve years prior to retirement. (For public-sector
employees, pensionable earnings are based on the last paycheck only.) Pen-
sionable earnings are converted into social security beneﬁts by applying a
2 percent factor (referred to as the rate of return) for each year of social
security tax payment up to a maximum of forty years (Brugiavini 1999). A
worker can thus get at most 80 percent of his pensionable earnings. Earn-
ings that enter the calculation of pensionable earnings are capped. Bene-
ﬁts are therefore also capped, at approximately €6,000 per month in 2000.
Contributions are not subject to any maximum. There is no actuarial ad-
justment for retirement age.5 There are no spousal beneﬁts in Italy. How-
ever, the entire beneﬁt becomes payable to a surviving spouse upon death
of the retiree. In 2000, the beneﬁt was never lower than a means-tested min-
imum beneﬁt of approximately €370 per month. A substantial fraction of
retirees receive this minimum beneﬁt. Beneﬁts are adjusted regularly for
nominal wages.
In the Netherlands, social security beneﬁt rules are very simple. Earn-
ings history does not play a role: the beneﬁts are almost exclusively a func-
tion of marital status and residency history. In 2001, unmarried individu-
als age sixty-ﬁve or older received €883 per month; married couples with
both spouses at least age sixty-ﬁve received €1,206 per month. Married
couples with one spouse below age sixty-ﬁve received between €603 and
€1,206, depending on the younger spouse’s income (Social Insurance Bank
2000). The eligibility age is sixty-ﬁve, and there is no provision for early re-
tirement.6 There is no link between labor force participation and entitle-
ment to social security. The full beneﬁts apply to residents who have lived
their entire working life (age ﬁfteen to sixty-four) in the Netherlands; ben-
eﬁts are reduced by 2 percent for every year spent abroad (Kapteyn and de
Vos 1999). Beneﬁts are adjusted annually for nominal wage growth.
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4. Italian social security beneﬁt calculations changed materially in 1992 and, to a lesser ex-
tent, in 1995. The changes will be phased in over a long period. Workers with at least eighteen
years of contributions in 1995 will receive beneﬁts computed on the basis of the rules apply-
ing before the 1992 reform (Franco 2000). For purposes of our analysis, which focuses on in-
dividuals aged ﬁfty and older, the pre-1992 regime therefore applies.
5. The 1992 and 1995 reforms made fundamental changes to beneﬁt calculations. Beneﬁts
are now uncapped but progressive, and there is an actuarial adjustment for retirement age. On
average, the new rules will reduce beneﬁts by 27–29 percent (Beltrametti 1996; Rostagno
1996).
6. Occupational pensions often oﬀer bridge beneﬁts between the (early) retirement age and
age sixty-ﬁve.Table 9.2 summarizes social security contribution rates and average re-
placement rates for the three countries. The replacement rates are the av-
erage over four scenarios and may therefore diﬀer from the average na-
tionwide replacement rates.7
9.3.2 Occupational Pensions
Occupational pensions are retirement income schemes that are spon-
sored by employers. The United States, Italy, and the Netherlands vary
widely in the role of occupational pensions. They are widespread, well
funded, and generous in the Netherlands; largely immaterial for most Ital-
ians (except for so-called severance pay arrangements; see below); and on
roughly equal footing with social security in the United States. Table 9.3
shows pension assets as a percentage of GDP, the percentage of retirees
with any pension beneﬁts, and the percentage of the working population
that is covered by a pension plan.
Traditionally, employer-sponsored pensions in the United States have
been of the deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) type. The plans are speciﬁc to individual
employers, not to industry groups—such as is mostly the case in the
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Table 9.3 Importance of occupational pensions (late 1990s)
Funds  Percent of retirees  Percent of working 
(% of GDP) receiving pension population covered
Italy Negligible Negligible 0.02
The Netherlands 118 76 (men) 23 (women) 90
United States 66 48 (men) 26 (women) 44
Source: Johnson (1999).
Table 9.2 Contribution and replacement rates
Contribution rate 
(% of taxable income)
Employer Employee Total Average replacement rate
United States 5.26 5.26 10.52 56.0
Italy 18.93 8.34 27.27 80.0
The Netherlands 0.00 17.90 17.90 45.8
Source: Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998).
7. The replacement rates are computed as averages of four scenarios: two earnings levels
(average and two-thirds of average), and two household compositions (single worker and
worker with a dependent spouse). The earnings proﬁle is assumed to be ﬂat, and earnings are
revalued according to changes in average earnings. The rates refer to basic pensions, means-
tested supplements, and mandatory occupational pensions only. See Blöndal and Scarpetta
(1998).Netherlands.8 Given that there are tens of thousands of diﬀerent plans,
their features vary widely. Portability is very limited. The beneﬁt is typically
ﬁxed in nominal terms upon job separation. An increasing fraction of DB
plans—64 percent in 1993—oﬀers the option of a lump-sum distribution
upon job separation (Scott and Shoven 1996). Workers who take that op-
tion may leave the distribution tax-sheltered by investing it in an individ-
ual retirement account (IRA) or they may cash it out (Hurd, Lillard, and
Panis 1998).
In 1978, 38 percent of American workers were covered by a DB pension,
compared to only 21 percent in 1997 (Department of Labor 2001). Instead,
deﬁned contribution (DC) plans are becoming more widespread (up from
7 percent in 1978 to 25 percent in 1997). Under DC plans, retirement in-
come depends on the level of contributions and the rate of return earned
on those contributions. Workers typically decide on the allocation on their
plan balance and bear the investment risk.
In Italy, the social security program was traditionally intended to pro-
vide comprehensive retirement income. In light of its social security pro-
gram’s dire ﬁnancial outlook, Italy established DC pension plans in 1992.
These plans are still in their infancy. As of March 1999, only approximately
400,000 workers were enrolled in a DC plan, and total assets represented
only 0.015 percent of GDP (Banca d’Italia 1999). With few exceptions,
there are no DB plans.
While not strictly a pension plan, so-called severance pay arrangements
have long played an important role in Italian retirement income security.
They are somewhat similar to DC plans but are paid out upon job separa-
tion, regardless of age. Employers contribute 6.9 percent of workers’ wages
into a self-administered fund (Franco 2000). Workers earn a legally deter-
mined return on those funds of 1.5 percent plus three-fourths of the inﬂa-
tion rate. While this severance entitlement is accruing, the worker has a
secure but uncollectable credit with his employer, who retains full discre-
tionary powers over the funds (Franco 2000). Upon job separation, there
is a lump-sum severance payment. Severance pay credits comprised 5.2
percent of household ﬁnancial wealth in 1997 (authors’ calculations, based
on the 1998 Survey of Household Income and Wealth [SHIW]).
In the Netherlands, occupational pensions are widespread and large.
Plans are organized by industry sectors and administered by industrial or-
ganizations. Virtually all pensions are DB pensions. They are easily ported
across employers. If a worker’s previous and new employers belong to the
same industrial organization, portability is merely an administrative issue.
If the employers belong to diﬀerent industrial organizations, the plan
administrators settle internally such that the previous administrator dis-
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8. The Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation, a federal agency, guarantees pension pay-
ments to retirees whose pension plan ended.burses a lump sum to the new administrator. The employee receives credit
for accumulated pension rights as part of the new pension.9All beneﬁts are
paid in the form of a lifelong annuity; lump-sum distributions upon job
termination are not allowed.
Of course, what matters for individual households is the combined re-
placement rate resulting from the combination of social security and oc-
cupational pensions. Table 9.4 provides an estimate of the after-tax re-
placement rates in the three countries for a typical (median) household.
Clearly, the replacement rate is highest in the Netherlands and lowest by
far in the United States.10 Based on microdata from the three countries, we
calculate and report below an alternative measure of replacement rate.
9.3.3 Private Savings
In addition to claims on social security and occupational pensions, in-
dividuals build up private savings to support them during retirement.
Private savings may take many forms. They may be held in ﬁnancial in-
struments, in real estate, or other. They are not restricted to after-tax funds.
Speciﬁcally, we include IRAs, universal life insurance, and similar tax-
sheltered accounts among private savings. The largest diﬀerences in private
saving across the United States, Italy, and the Netherlands lie in opportu-
nities to save in tax-sheltered instruments.
Americans may accumulate retirement savings in IRAs. Individuals may
contribute up to $2,000 annually to IRAs.11 In traditional IRAs, contribu-
tions are tax deductible; distributions (including interest) are taxed at the
time of the distribution. Contributions are fully tax deductible only for per-
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9. For example, suppose someone worked for twelve years under a plan that promises a ben-
eﬁt equal to 1.5 percent of last earned salary for every year worked. His new plan promises 2.0
percent of last earned salary per year worked. The worker receives credit in his new plan for
(12   1.5) 2.0   9 years of work, as if those years were worked at the new employer under the
new pension plan.
10. There are many ways to calculate replacement rates. Table 9.4 is therefore not directly
comparable to table 9.2. However, within each table, the rates are computed in the same man-
ner.
11. Individuals who separate from a job with a pension plan may often take a lump-sum
distribution of their pension rights. Such distributions may be rolled over into an IRA and
remain tax sheltered. There is no limit on the amount that may be contributed to IRAs in this
manner.





Source: Gruber and Wise (1999).sons whose income falls below certain phaseout levels, which depend on
whether the person is covered by an occupational pension. Since 1997, so-
called Roth IRAs allow for after-tax contributions; distributions (includ-
ing interest) are tax-free. By the end of 1999, the assets in IRAs amounted
to $2.47 trillion (Copeland 2001). By comparison, assets of private DB and
DC pension plans amounted to $2.14 trillion and $2.53 trillion, respec-
tively (Federal Reserve 2001).
There is no Italian equivalent of IRAs. However, all Italians are eligible
for universal life insurance contracts that are hybrids of term life insurance
and savings plans: they pay out a beneﬁt upon death or reaching a speciﬁc
age, whichever comes ﬁrst. The general principle of taxation on these con-
tracts is very favorable: both contributions and beneﬁts are partially tax ex-
empt. The value of such life insurance contracts comprised 5.5 percent of
household ﬁnancial wealth in 1997 (authors’ calculations, based on the
1998 SHIW).
The situation is similar in the Netherlands. Dutch law does not recognize
IRAs but oﬀers tax advantages for universal life insurance policies. The
limit up to which contributions are tax deferred has ﬂuctuated widely. Prior
to 1992 the limit was €7,300, ﬁxed in nominal terms. In 1992 the limit was
lowered. For the year 2000 it was €5,600 for a married couple. (Starting in
2001 the limit is lower yet, at only €1,000; it is higher for individuals with
income over which no pension rights are accumulated, such as the use of a
company car.) Dutch universal life insurance payments must take the form
of a lifelong or ﬁxed-term annuity. The annuity beneﬁts are subject to in-
come tax.
Rates of return in the stock market have varied substantially across the
three countries. Consider the Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) index, representative of large companies and computed consis-
tently over time and across countries. Between 1970 and mid-2001, the
overall annual rate of return, including reinvested dividends, was highest in
the Netherlands (13.8 percent nominal, 10.9 percent real), followed by the
United States (11.9 percent nominal, 8.3 percent real), and Italy (11.2 per-
cent nominal, 2.3 percent real). The Italian market exhibited markedly
more volatility. For example, the standard deviation of annual nominal re-
turns in Italy was 34.4 percent, compared to 16.6 percent in the United
States and 21.7 percent in the Netherlands.
9.3.4 Capital Market Imperfections
Access to capital markets for households varies across the three coun-
tries. We discuss housing transactions, mortgages, and transaction costs of
stock purchases.
Transaction costs of housing in the United States consist largely of real
estate agent fees (approximately 6 percent of the house price) and legal fees
(roughly 2 percent). Transfer taxes are negligible in most areas. In the
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1.5 percent of the house price) and a transfer tax of 6 percent. Legal fees
are minimal by comparison. House transaction costs are higher in Italy
than in the United States and the Netherlands. Real estate agent fees are 8–
10 percent, and a transfer tax of 6–7 percent applies.
There is a well-developed mortgage market in the United States, includ-
ing a standardized secondary market. Buyers may choose variable or ﬁxed
interest rate loans of up to thirty years’ maturity. The typical down pay-
ment is 10 or 20 percent of the value of the house, but full ﬁnancing is avail-
able. Interest payments are generally fully deductible for income tax pur-
poses. The mortgage market is much less developed in Italy, perhaps due to
banks’ limited ability to sell the house in case of default on mortgage pay-
ments. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the associated legal proceedings
may take as long as ten years. Banks therefore typically require a down
payment of 40 to 50 percent of the price of the house. In the Netherlands
the mortgage market is well developed, with a wide variety of loan options
available. Many mortgage products are tied to universal life insurances,
largely to take maximal advantage of the tax deductibility of mortgage in-
terest. In principle, there are no down payment requirements. To cover the
transaction costs of buying a house, mortgages of up to 110 percent of the
transaction price are available and common. In 1998, per capita mortgage
debt in the United States ($15,421) and the Netherlands (€14,167) was al-
most identical, and about ten times as large as in Italy (€1,415) (De Neder-
landsche Bank 2000; Federal Reserve 2001).
The three countries may also face diﬀerent transactions costs for the
purchase and sale of stocks. An informal Internet search in March 2002 re-
vealed roughly comparable fees for unassisted stock transactions via on-
line brokers. In the United States, E-Trade (us.etrade.com) charges $14.95–
19.95 per transaction, and Charles Schwab (www.schwab.com) charges
$29.95 for up to 1,000 shares. In the Netherlands, Robeco (www.robecodi-
rect.nl) charges 0.3–0.4 percent of the total transaction, often with a €15
minimum. In Italy, Twicetrade (www.twicetrade.it) charges €12 plus the
lower of €0.019 per share and €19. The diﬀerences are not large. However,
they reﬂect current online trades only. Actual average commissions during
our analysis period (mid- to late 1990s), when online banking was far less
developed, are likely much higher. We do not have comparable information
on trends in transactions costs.
9.3.5 Exposure to Financial Risks Before and After Retirement
We now turn to ﬁnancial risks before and after retirement. Before re-
tirement, the main source of ﬁnancial risk is earnings uncertainty. Casual
observation would suggest that in the United States, earnings uncertainty
is considerably larger than in Italy or the Netherlands. Social insurance
programs (unemployment, sickness, disability) in the two European coun-
290 Arie Kapteyn and Constantijn Panistries are generally more generous than in the United States, and employ-
ment protection laws make it relatively hard to ﬁre employees in Italy and
the Netherlands. An interesting piece of direct evidence on earnings un-
certainty comes from a common question asked in household surveys in
the three countries. The question asks respondents directly for the amount
of income uncertainty they face. Guiso, Jappelli, and Pistaferri (1999) an-
alyzed the coeﬃcient of variation of income uncertainty for the United
States, the Netherlands, and Italy. They found that income uncertainty
across respondents had about the same distribution in Italy and the Nether-
lands. By contrast, U.S. respondents reported much more income uncer-
tainty than the respondents in the two European countries.
Loss of earnings due to disability is another important ﬁnancial risk be-
fore retirement. In all three countries, workers may count on long-term dis-
ability insurance in case of disability. Generally, public disability insurance
schemes are more generous in Italy and the Netherlands than in the United
States. In many cases, workers are covered by private disability insurance
in all three countries.
After retirement, the main source of ﬁnancial risk is health related.
Americans face greater risks of large out-of-pocket medical expenses than
their Dutch or Italian counterparts. In the Netherlands, virtually all elderly
are covered by comprehensive health insurance with negligible out-of-
pocket expenses. In Italy, the public health system grants essentially free as-
sistance to the entire population in case of illness. However, only inpatient
assistance is provided, implying substantial out-of-pocket expenses for the
elderly in case of a serious illness that requires little hospital care. In the
United States, the elderly may face serious out-of-pocket medical expenses,
depending on their insurance coverage. Elderly with low income and ﬁnan-
cial assets are typically eligible for Medicaid, which oﬀers fairly compre-
hensive insurance, including for deductibles. The risks are also limited for
elderly that are covered by both private health insurance and Medicare, a
public health insurance program for the elderly and disabled. However,
American elderly who rely only on Medicare face substantial risks of large
out-of-pocket expenses. Medicare consists of two components. Coverage
for part A is almost universal; it covers inpatient expenses in hospitals and
skilled nursing facilities. Most elderly also have supplemental (part B) cov-
erage, purchased at subsidized rates. Medicare requires copayments that
can be substantial, especially in the case of long hospital stays.
9.4 Data
Our analysis is based on microdata on individuals aged ﬁfty and older
from each country. For the United States, we use the Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS); for Italy, the SHIW; and for the Netherlands, the So-
cioEconomic Panel (SEP). We brieﬂy describe each survey.
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HRS is a national longitudinal sample of households with at least one per-
son born in 1931–41 (ﬁfty-one to sixty-one years old at the 1992 baseline)
or 1923 or before, that is, with at least one person aged seventy or over in
1993. The 1998 interview added the 1924–30 and 1942–47 birth cohorts, so
that the most recent data cover all individuals over age ﬁfty. We use the
1998 data and rely on other waves (1992–2000) where longitudinal infor-
mation is needed. The principal objective of the HRS is to monitor eco-
nomic transitions in work, income, wealth, and changes in health status.
The ﬁrst wave of data was collected in 1992 (1993 for the pre-1923 birth co-
hort), with follow-ups ﬁelded at approximately two-year intervals. Blacks,
Hispanics, and Florida residents were oversampled at a rate of two to one.
The 1998 HRS contained 21,351 respondents: 8,949 men and 12,402
women.
The main wealth data for Italy is the SHIW, collected by the Banca 
d’Italia, Italy’s central bank. Its main purpose is to collect detailed data on
demographics, household consumption, income, and balance sheets. This
survey is representative of the Italian population and has been ﬁelded bian-
nually since 1984. Financial wealth data have only been publicly available
since 1989. Beginning in 1989, some but not all of the households were 
re-interviewed in subsequent panels. The panel component has increased
over time—in 1989, 29 percent of the households were re-interviewed and
by 1995, 45 percent were re-interviewed. The sample size is about 8,500
households. The SHIW contains questions on detailed asset and debt cat-
egories.
For the Netherlands, we rely on the SEP, a representative panel survey
conducted by Statistics Netherlands. The SEP covers about 5,000 house-
holds and is representative of the noninstitutionalized Dutch population.
It contains detailed information about a number of household demo-
graphic characteristics and collects data on household income and wealth.
The SEP has been collected annually since 1984. It is a panel data set. Since
1987, the SEP contains a wealth module with fairly detailed questions on
asset and debt categories. These categories have varied somewhat during
the course of the panel. Because of problems collecting the data, no asset
and debt information has been collected on the self-employed since 1990.
In 1997, the SEP contained 8,904 respondents: 4,385 men and 4,519
women.
9.5 Method and Hypotheses
The aim of this paper is to exploit institutional variation across countries
to shed light on the eﬀect of diﬀerent policies on the wealth accumulation
and portfolio choices of households near or in retirement. Since, at this
stage, we are only considering three countries, we have in a sense only three
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oretical approach we would have very few degrees of freedom to establish
any empirical regularity with reasonable conﬁdence. We therefore take a
diﬀerent approach. Drawing on the theoretical framework of the life-cycle
hypothesis and the description of institutional diﬀerences across countries
we formulate a number of stylized predictions, which are next confronted
with the data at hand. The more these predictions are corroborated by the
microdata, the more conﬁdent we can be that the policies in the diﬀerent
countries help explain the diﬀerences in wealth accumulation and portfo-
lio composition that we observe.
An important caveat in our analysis will be that we generally assume that
policies are exogenous. Thus, for example, we exclude the possibility that
social security beneﬁts are generous because citizens of a country have an
innate tendency to save too little for retirement.
We brieﬂy characterize a number of stylized facts that we expect to hold
in the microdata across the three countries as a result of their institutional
diﬀerences and the theoretical framework. We formulate our “predic-
tions” as rather informal hypotheses, with generally a ceteris paribus
clause to account for other counteracting institutional eﬀects.
Hypothesis 1: The Displacement Eﬀects of Retirement Beneﬁts
A straightforward implication of the LCH is that more generous retire-
ment beneﬁts will induce less saving for retirement. We will therefore con-
sider replacement rates at retirement in the three countries and predict that
the country with the lowest replacement rate will be the country with the
highest saving rate, ceteris paribus. Based on the discussion above we ex-
pect retirement savings to be most prominent in the United States and least
prominent in the Netherlands, at least at the median.
Hypothesis 2: The Role of Earnings and Consumption Uncertainty
The LCH, extended to incorporate uncertainty, predicts that the intro-
duction of additional uncertainty increases an agent’s saving if and only
if the agent is “prudent” (Kimball 1990; Gollier 2001).12 Empirical work
suggests that generally an increase in risk leads to more saving, but the
estimated magnitude varies considerably across studies (e.g., Dynan 1993;
Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese 1992; Lusardi 1997; Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes 1994a,b, 1995; Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini 2001).
Saving for precautionary reasons should be most prominent in a coun-
try with the highest earnings uncertainty. We will invoke subjective infor-
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12. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for prudence is that an agent’s marginal utility of
future consumption is convex (Gollier 2001, Proposition 60). Prudence is related to, but is not
the same as, risk aversion. A consumer is prudent if absolute risk aversion is decreasing in
wealth; in the special case of constant relative risk aversion, (relative) prudence is equal to
(relative) risk aversion   1.mation on earnings uncertainty to support the assumption that earnings
uncertainty is highest in the United States and hence that we would expect
to have the highest level of precautionary saving in the United States, again
under ceteris paribus conditions. In addition to earnings uncertainty, con-
sumption uncertainty may be important as well. A prime example of con-
sumption uncertainty would be the possibility of unforeseen large out-of-
pocket medical expenses. It appears that this kind of consumption risk is
considerably larger in the United States than in Europe. Hence, even after
retirement, when earnings uncertainty presumably does not play a role
anymore, we would still expect precautionary motives to lead to a stronger
desire to hold bequeathable wealth in the United States than in Italy or the
Netherlands.
Hypothesis 3: The Role of Capital Market Imperfections
In the basic, stripped-down version of the LCH, consumers may be bor-
rowing to ﬁnance consumption at a young age and enter middle age with
negative wealth. Only after earnings exceed optimal lifetime consumption
will saving become positive. Clearly such a pattern will not be observed if
capital market imperfections prevent substantial borrowing at young ages.
A point in case is the possibility to obtain home mortgages. As observed
above,  the typical minimum down payment requirement in the United
States is 10–20 percent. In Italy the minimum down payment is on the or-
der of 40–50 percent. In the Netherlands one can buy a house with a nega-
tive down payment up to 10 percent (i.e., one can borrow 110 percent of the
market value of the house). Aspiring homeowners will thus need to save the
most in Italy and the least in the Netherlands. From a liquidity constraints
perspective, the risk of an adverse income shock yields the same result.
Without liquidity constraints, the consumption eﬀects of an adverse income
shock may be spread out over many periods by borrowing to pay for current
consumption and reducing consumption in all future periods by a little bit,
rather than immediately cutting consumption by the total shortfall in in-
come. Liquidity constraints limit the possibility to spread out the con-
sumption shortfall over many periods. The only way to reduce the risk of
such a forced reduction in consumption is to save more. Savings then act as
a “buﬀer stock” (Deaton 1991; Carroll 1992, 1997). Liquidity constraints
thus increase saving, even if they are not binding in the current period.
Diﬀerences in capital market structure in the three countries thus predict
that Italy should have the highest saving rate and the Netherlands the low-
est. In addition, when considering net household wealth, Italy should be the
country where net wealth, as a percentage of gross wealth, is highest.
Hypothesis 4: Portfolio Composition
The preceding hypotheses imply higher levels of private wealth in Italy
and the United States upon retirement than in the Netherlands. The impli-
cations for stock ownership and the share of wealth that is held in stocks
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least some fraction in stocks. The data clearly do not support this predic-
tion, possibly because of the cost of acquiring information about stocks,
transaction costs, and minimum investment requirements (Haliassos and
Bertaut 1995; Vissing Jørgensen 2000). Standard theory further predicts
that, under the usual assumption of constant relative risk aversion, the
share of risky assets does not vary with wealth. However, economies of
scale in portfolio management costs would induce a positive correlation
between the share of risky assets and wealth. Empirically, people with
more wealth own more risky assets, such as stocks (e.g., Hochgürtel 1998;
Barsky et al., 1997; Carroll 2001; Hurd 2001).
The above suggests that stock ownership in Italy and the United States
should be higher than in the Netherlands. On the other hand, the less well-
developed capital market in Italy may reduce stock ownership in Italy. Sim-
ilarly, the existence of more earnings and consumption uncertainty (e.g.,
medical expenses) in the United States may depress stock ownership in fa-
vor of more secure assets. We hypothesize that stock ownership in the
Netherlands will be the lowest among the three countries, because of the
lowest level of private wealth. In the United States, the combination of a
well-developed capital market and a high level of private wealth for retire-
ment and precautionary purposes should induce a relatively high level of
stock ownership.
9.6 Empirical Analysis
We begin by presenting a number of relevant descriptive statistics for the
three countries. We then discuss the evidence in favor of (or against) the hy-
potheses we have formulated above. Most of the analyses are in simple tab-
ular form, with sometimes an excursion to multivariate analyses.
9.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
For Italy and the Netherlands, we restrict our analysis to households with
a head over age ﬁfty. For the United States, we consider the entire 1998
HRS, representative of the population age ﬁfty-one and older. Table 9.5
presents data for 1998 for the United States and Italy and 1997 for the
Netherlands. The table indicates that the age distributions in the three coun-
tries are very similar, with samples roughly equally split between heads of
household under and over age sixty-ﬁve. Italian and Dutch respondents are
somewhat more likely to be married than American respondents. Based on
the educational distributions reported in table 9.5, U.S. respondents appear
to be somewhat better educated than their Italian and Dutch counterparts.
The comparison should be interpreted with caution, though, because the
schooling systems diﬀer greatly across the three countries.
The mean noncapital after-tax household income in the United States
was higher than in Italy and the Netherlands, whereas median income was
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Italy and the Netherlands compared to the United States.
Our hypotheses are couched in terms of accumulated savings and allo-
cation into risky assets. Given the information in the microdata, we deﬁne
risky assets as stock and bond holdings. An intuitive measure of risky as-
set allocation is the ratio of risky assets to net worth. Unfortunately, non-
negligible subsamples report zero or negative net worth, so that the ratio of
risky assets to net worth cannot be determined or is very diﬃcult to inter-
pret. Instead, we deﬁne two related measures. Consider households’ bal-
ance sheets in table 9.6.
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Table 9.5 Demographics and income (unit of observation: household)
United States Italy The Netherlands
Number of households 14,147 4,200 1,487
Age household head
50–59 35.1 38.0 33.0
60–64 13.7 16.8 15.4
65  51.2 45.2 51.6
Household structure
Couple 53.4 67.4 60.8
Single male 11.1 8.8 10.6
Single female 35.5 23.8 28.7
Education household head
Elementary 33.0a 51.8 30.6
Some high school 24.8 18.4b
High school 29.2 16.5 32.2c
Some college 37.8 7.0 18.8d
Household noncapital income
Mean $26,500 €24,000 €24,600
Median $18,800 €20,400 €21,300
aless than high school
blower vocational/junior high school
cmiddle vocational
dat least high school
13. The American HRS collects gross income data, whereas the Italian SHIW and Dutch
SEP ask for after-tax income. We estimated tax liabilities to convert the American income
data to be net of taxes. Since the state of residence and many ﬁnancial details are unknown,
we assume standard deductions and account for federal taxation only. This includes federal
income tax and Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) liabilities. Incomes after state
income tax, where applicable, are therefore slightly lower than reported in table 9.5.Very few respondents report having no gross wealth at all. Both exposure,
deﬁned as the ratio of risky assets to gross wealth, and solvency, deﬁned as
the ratio of net worth to gross wealth, are therefore straightforward to con-
struct.
Table 9.7characterizes the size and composition of bequeathable house-
hold wealth in the three samples. The American and Italian ﬁgures are
based on 1998 HRS and SHIW, the Dutch on the 1997 SEP. As predicted,
the Netherlands has by far the lowest level of private household wealth,
both in the mean and in the median. Partly this reﬂects the lower home
ownership rate in the Netherlands for these older cohorts. Stock or bond
ownership is highest in the United States (33 percent) and lowest in the
Netherlands (19 percent). Following table 9.6, we aggregated assets in four
broad categories: (a) safe assets (saving and checking accounts, cash); (b)
risky assets (stocks and bonds); (c) housing and other real estate; and (d)
other. Since the Dutch sample excludes the self-employed, we have ex-
cluded business equity in all countries. U.S. households clearly hold the
most risky assets, both in absolute value and as a fraction of gross wealth.
Dutch households hold more of their gross wealth in safe assets than the
Americans and Italians. Again, this partly reﬂects the lower home owner-
ship rate in the Netherlands for this age group. In both the United States
and the Netherlands, the share of risky assets increased between 1992 and
1997–98 (not shown). The average solvency ratios are large and negative in
the United States and Italy, because the ratios are dominated by house-
holds with negative net worth that is large relative to their reported gross
wealth.
9.6.2 Empirical Evidence for the Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The Displacement Eﬀects of Retirement Beneﬁts
Although we have provided some evidence that replacement rates at re-
tirement are lowest in the United States and highest in the Netherlands, it
is useful to exploit our microdata to shed further light on this. The re-
placement rates given in section 9.3.2 were based on hypothetical (median)
individuals in the three diﬀerent countries and on plausible institutional
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Table 9.6 Stylized household balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Safe (cash, savings accounts) S Net worth NW
Risky (stocks, bonds) R Debts (mortgage and other) D
Gross housing (housing equity   mortgage debt) H
Other O
Gross wealth GW Gross wealth GW298 Arie Kapteyn and Constantijn Panis
Table 9.7 Assets and asset allocation (unit of observation: household)
United States Italy The Netherlands
Gross wealth
Mean 276,200 168,100 95,300
Median 130,000 96,500 45,200
Net worth
Mean 253,400 166,200 79,300
Median 105,000 95,000 33,500
Owns house (%)
Mean 76.8 71.8 46.5
Median 100 100 0
Owns stocks/bonds (%)
Mean 33.0 26.8 18.7
Median 0 0 0
Exposure (R/GW)
Mean 0.079 0.051 0.039
Median 0 0 0
Solvency (NW/GW)
Mean –51.8 –18.3 0.62
Median 1 1 1
Housing equity (if owner)
Mean 128,200 121,800 111,600
Median 95,000 100,000 95,800
Stocks/bonds (if owner)
Mean 169,500 54,483 45,700
Median 45,000 20,000 16,900
Portfolio shares (%)
Safe (S/GW)
Mean 20.4 29.4 43.4
Risky (R/GW)
Mean 7.9 5.1 3.9
House (H/GW)
Mean 45.6 53.2 38.6
Other (O/GW)
Mean 26.0 12.3 14.0
Note: Monetary values in $ for the United States and in € for Italy and the Netherlands.
parameters. Here we take a diﬀerent approach. We exploit the longitudinal
nature of the data to consider incomes in the waves before and after a re-
spondent ﬁrst reports being retired to gauge the actual change in income
experienced by those who retire. For example, if someone ﬁrst reports be-
ing retired in 1994, we consider incomes as reported in 1993 and 1995. (In
the American HRS and Italian SHIW data, the waves are two years apart,
except three years for the 1995–98 SHIW.) This approach avoids contami-
nation from part-year employment. We consider household noncapital in-
come before and after individual retirement. This assumes resource sharing
within a household, so that, for instance, a transfer of resources by other
household members compensates for a drop in the new retiree’s income.This assumption acknowledges the joint nature of retirement decisions
(e.g., Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer 1996; Gustman and Steinmeier 1994;
Maestas 2001). Finally, we consider after-tax income,14 expressed in con-
stant 1998 dollars.
The top panel of table 9.8presents empirical after-tax replacement rates
for the United States based on the 1992–2000 HRS. The table compares in-
comes in the wave before retirement and the wave after retirement,15 that
is, at t – 2 and t   2. Postretirement income is substantially lower than pre-
retirement income, both in the mean and the median.16 The average re-
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14. See note 13.
15. For the United States and Italy, retirement is deﬁned based on respondent’s own report
of (complete) retirement status. For the Netherlands, retirement is deﬁned as receiving some
form of income transfer (pension, disability, or unemployment beneﬁts), being over ﬁfty years
old, and not doing any work for pay.
16. In order to exploit the longitudinal feature of the HRS, the sample consists of original
HRS respondents, that is, those born in 1931–41 and their spouses. The sample is thus
younger than the sample used in table 9.5, which included all HRS cohorts. This explains why
mean and median income levels in table 9.8 exceed those in table 9.5.
Table 9.8 Empirical replacement rates, wealth accumulation, and income growth in the
United States
10th 90th 
N Mean percentile Median percentile
Newly retired
Preretirement household noncapital 
income 1,953 36,600 6,900 30,600 69,500
Postretirement income 1,797 26,100 6,500 21,200 47,300
Postretirement income   annuity value 
of wealth 1,797 44,100 9,000 34,100 83,100
Replacement rate (%) 1,749 147.1 28.7 75.7 175.2
Generalized replacement ratea 1,749 261.0 47.6 111.4 271.6
Not newly retired
Noncapital household income t – 2 29,442 36,800 7,000 30,000 69,200
Noncapital household income t   2 28,894 35,900 6,300 29,500 68,700
Income ratio (t   2)/(t – 2) (%) 19,463 213.1 33.5 97.8 179.6
Newly retired
Preretirement household net worth 1,982 215,200 1,100 115,600 491,600
Postretirement household net worth 1,815 254,900 1,000 124,700 594,500
Wealth growth (%) 1,746 41.9 –85.1 2.2 169.0
Not newly retired
Net worth t – 2 29,735 246,400 2,500 113,200 552,200
Net worth t   2 29,204 267,700 3,200 119,900 588,000
Wealth growth (%) 19,936 114.3 –83.2 6.6 192.8
Note: N   number of observations.
aPostretirement noncapital household income   annuity value of wealth divided by preretirement non-
capital household income. The annuity value assumes a 3 percent interest rate.placement rate is well above unity, but this is driven by a small number of
respondents with particularly low preretirement income. The median re-
placement rate is 75.7 percent. There is large variation: at the 10th per-
centile, income dropped by three-quarters after retirement, whereas it in-
creased by three-quarters in real terms at the 90th percentile.
To put these ﬁndings in perspective, compare the income changes be-
tween the year before retirement and the year after retirement with income
changes of individuals who did not retire (i.e., who worked in years t – 2, t,
t   2, or who were retired in all three waves). We observe that the latter in-
dividuals also experienced a decline in real income, at least at the median.
The decline in income is far smaller at the median (2.2 percent) than the
median decline among newly retired individuals (24.3 percent).
The replacement rate improves if we assume that individuals who retire
can annuitize their wealth and consume the annuity. Adding the annuity
value of bequeathable wealth to postretirement income, possible con-
sumption levels exceed preretirement income for most households. We de-
ﬁne the generalized replacement rate as the sum of postretirement income
and annuity value of private wealth divided by preretirement income. At
the median, the generalized replacement rate is above one (111.4 percent).
Even at the 10th percentile, postretirement consumption may be sustained
at almost half the level of preretirement income.
The bottom part of table 9.8 presents a similar analysis for household
net worth around retirement and compares changes to wealth changes of
households in which no retirement takes place. Most households experi-
ence wealth growth, but wealth grows somewhat faster for households who
do not have a recently retired member. At the median, the increase is 2.2
percent among households that transitioned through retirement and 6.6
percent among those who did not.
Similar to table 9.8, table 9.9 documents income replacement rates,
wealth accumulation, and income growth in Italy, based on 1987–98 data.
Table 9.8 was in 1998 dollars; table 9.9 in 1998 euros. As in the United
States, real household noncapital income tends to drop after retirement.
However, the declines are milder. At the median, postretirement Italian
household incomes replace 85.9 percent of preretirement income, about 10
percentage points above the median U.S. replacement rate. While there is
substantial variation, the diﬀerences are smaller than in the United States.
For example, at the 10th and 90th percentile, postretirement incomes are
about 50 percent below and above their preretirement levels, compared to
three-quarter diﬀerences in the United States. At the median, real incomes
among households that did not transition through a retirement remained
almost exactly constant. Naturally, the replacement rates increase when in-
cluding the annuity value of net worth. The median generalized replace-
ment rate for new retirees in Italy is 124.5 percent, again greater than in the
United States (111.4 percent).
300 Arie Kapteyn and Constantijn PanisItalian households enjoyed greater wealth gains than American house-
holds during the mid- and late 1990s. At the median, net worth among
households with a new retiree increased by 24 percent. This gain exceeds
the gain among households that did not experience a retirement (14.5 per-
cent), probably because of severance payments (see above).
Table 9.10 shows the same set of statistics for the Netherlands, based on
1984–97 income reports and 1987–97 wealth data. Income and wealth val-
ues are in 1998 euros. Dutch replacement rates generally exceed those of
both the United States and Italy. At the median, fully 102.3 percent of real
preretirement income is replaced. The spread is narrower than in the other
two countries. At the 10th and 90th percentile, only about one-third of pre-
retirement income is lost or gained, compared to one-half in Italy and
three-quarters in the United States. Dutch households without a new re-
tiree also fared well—at the median, their real household noncapital in-
come rose by 8.1 percent. The spread is again small, much smaller than in
the United States and Italy. (This is in part explained by the fact that the
Dutch income and wealth ﬁgures refer to survey waves that are only two
years apart; the Dutch SEP survey is conducted annually, whereas Ameri-
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Table 9.9 Empirical replacement rates, wealth accumulation, and income growth in Italy
10th 90th 
N Mean percentile Median percentile
Newly retired
Preretirement household noncapital 
income 402 33,800 15,300 30,150 55,300
Postretirement income 402 30,300 11,600 26,150 51,800
Postretirement income   annuity value 
of wealth 402 46,100 14,000 39,100 79,500
Replacement rate (%) 402 97.3 49.1 85.9 147.5
Generalized replacement ratea 402 143.7 65.5 124.5 231.9
Not newly retired
Noncapital household income t – 2 5,682 25,300 9,800 21,500 45,100
Noncapital household income t   2 5,682 26,000 9,600 21,400 46,300
Income ratio (t   2)/(t – 2) (%) 5,673 112.0 57.9 100.8 170.0
Newly retired
Preretirement household net worth 402 187,200 7,700 122,650 435,200
Postretirement household net worth 402 225,000 11,100 153,650 515,400
Wealth growth (%) 398 320.8 –68.4 24.0 350.6
Not newly retired
Net worth t – 2 5,682 154,600 3,800 87,900 350,600
Net worth t   2 5,682 189,900 4,400 110,000 431,500
Wealth growth (%) 5,595 305.2 –73.3 14.5 373.2
Note: N   number of observations.
aPostretirement noncapital household income   annuity value of wealth divided by preretirement non-
capital household income. The annuity value assumes a 3 percent interest rate.can HRS and Italian SHIW waves are generally two years apart.) Adding
in the annuity value of net worth increases the replacement rates, though
not by very much. This reﬂects the small average wealth holdings among
Dutch households.
In the Netherlands, households with a newly retired member enjoyed an
increase of 4.5 percent in net worth, far lower than in Italy but somewhat
higher than in the United States. The increase among households without
a retiring member was one-eighth in two years time, more than the com-
parable American and Italian ﬁgures.
In summary, replacement rates are lowest in the United States and high-
est in the Netherlands, with a gap at the median of 26.6 percentage points.
However, American households accumulate far more private savings than
their Dutch counterparts. The replacement rate gap narrows to just 3.1
percentage points when we include the annuity value of net worth in the
calculations. This is fully consistent with a life-cycle model in which retire-
ment saving is crowded out by institutional old age pension provisions in
the Netherlands, but much less so in the United States.
Clearly, we do not control for the endogeneity of the retirement decision
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Table 9.10 Empirical replacement rates, wealth accumulation, and income growth in
the Netherlands
10th 90th 
N Mean percentile Median percentile
Newly retired
Preretirement household noncapital 
income 772 22,200 10,500 18,800 38,600
Postretirement income 772 21,900 10,900 18,600 37,400
Postretirement income   annuity value 
of wealth 772 26,900 12,100 22,900 49,700
Replacement rate (%) 772 113.9 68.0 102.3 138.3
Generalized replacement ratea 772 137.1 80.8 114.5 187.2
Not newly retired
Noncapital household income t – 1 52,333 27,300 12,600 25,900 43,200
Noncapital household income t   1 52,333 29,600 13,000 28,100 47,000
Income ratio (t   1)/(t – 1) (%) 52,333 124.3 81.8 108.1 138.9
Newly retired
Preretirement household net worth 802 63,400 600 23,400 172,600
Postretirement household net worth 802 67,000 800 23,000 175,400
Wealth growth (%) 800 –82.0 –61.2 4.5 128.3
Not newly retired
Net worth t – 1 55,995 47,900 100 23,300 121,500
Net worth t   1 55,995 57,100 400 31,100 141,100
Wealth growth (%) 55,995 118.2 –79.7 12.5 164.2
Note: N   number of observations.
aPostretirement noncapital household income   annuity value of wealth divided by preretirement non-
capital household income. The annuity value assumes a 3 percent interest rate.in the empirical analysis. One would expect that, other things being equal,
an individual facing a low replacement rate and with little bequeathable
wealth to be less likely to retire than an individual with a high replacement
rate and substantial bequeathable wealth. By working longer one may be
able to increase one’s wealth. This will tend to improve the generalized re-
placement rate. Hence, the relatively small observed diﬀerences in gener-
alized replacement rates between the United States and the Netherlands
may partly be due to the fact that Americans have a stronger incentive to
work longer. Thus, the relatively modest diﬀerences in generalized replace-
ment rates across the United States and the Netherlands may be the result
of at least two behavioral reactions to diﬀerences in replacement rates:
these aﬀect both saving decisions and retirement decisions.
Hypothesis 2: The Eﬀect of Earnings and Consumption Uncertainty
Above we argued that Americans face greater ﬁnancial risks, both be-
fore and after retirement. A problem in a cross-country context with the
data at hand is that we do not have individual information on the amount
of uncertainty faced by the individuals in our sample. Since there are at
least two diﬀerent strong incentives for households in the United States to
accumulate more private wealth than in Italy or the Netherlands (precau-
tion and to provide for retirement), it is probably impossible to disentangle
the relative inﬂuence of the two diﬀerent incentives. We have argued above
that in any case retirement provisions provide a powerful explanation for
the diﬀerence in wealth accumulation between the United States and the
Netherlands. Providing further insight into the patterns of wealth accu-
mulation in Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States, table 9.11 pre-
sents results of a regression of household net worth on a number of house-
hold characteristics.
Since both household income and net worth have a skewed distribution,
we have applied a loglike transformation to these variables. A direct loga-
rithmic transformation is not possible, since both variables can take on
negative values. Hence we adopted the inverse hyperbolic sine: h(x)  
log( x2   1     x). For values of x not too close to zero, h(x) is approxi-
mately equal to log(2x) for positive xand –log(2x) for negative x. The func-
tion h(x) is antisymmetric: h(x)   –h(–x). The drawback of the inverse hy-
perbolic sine in comparison to the logarithm is that it is not invariant to a
change of units. The regressions reported involve both quantities measured
in U.S. dollars and quantities measured in euros. If we were to use logs of
the monetary variables, the currency diﬀerences would simply be absorbed
in the country-speciﬁc intercepts. For the inverse hyperbolic sine, that is
only approximately true.17
Table 9.11 presents two regressions. The ﬁrst regression involves full in-
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17. We measure net worth in dollars and euros, so that the outcome is far from zero for most
respondents with nonzero net worth. At zero, there is no scale issue.Table 9.11 Cross country regressions for net worth
Separate age functions IT/NL same age function
Dummy SEP1992 541.482 4.479∗∗∗
(0.74) (6.26)
Dummy SEP1997 541.655 4.673∗∗∗
(0.74) (6.49)
Dummy HRS1992 622.872 –41.788
(0.86) (0.56)
















High school, US 1.073∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗
(8.68) (8.68)
More than high school, US 1.682∗∗∗ 1.682∗∗∗
(18.07) (18.06)
Some high school, IT 0.900∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗
(4.73) (4.86)
High school, IT 1.529∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗
(6.89) (7.03)
Some college, IT 2.016∗∗∗ 2.017∗∗∗
(6.47) (6.48)
Lower vocational/junior high, NL 1.034∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗
(4.02) (3.94)
Middle vocational, NL 2.044∗∗∗ 1.989∗∗∗
(8.92) (8.82)
Some college, NL 2.829∗∗∗ 2.788∗∗∗
(10.42) (10.41)
No. of observations 21,517 21,517
R2 0.08 0.08
Notes: Dependent variables: Inverse hyperbolic sine h( ) of household net worth. Absolute
value of t-statistics in parentheses. US   United States; IT   Italy; NL   the Netherlands.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.teractions of all variables with country dummies, which is equivalent to
having separate equations for each country. It turned out that the age func-
tions of Italy and the Netherlands are quite similar, an impression that was
conﬁrmed by a statistical test. Hence, the regression was repeated with
identical age functions for the Netherlands and Italy. We speciﬁed the
eﬀect of age on wealth accumulation as a ﬁfth-degree polynomial. Rather
than presenting the estimated coeﬃcients of the polynomials, we sketch the
estimated age functions in ﬁgure 9.1.
Figure 9.1 shows that after age ﬁfty, American households keep accu-
mulating wealth at a brisk pace, whereas the age proﬁle in the Netherlands
and Italy is approximately ﬂat or slightly downward sloping. This would be
consistent with the prevalence of a precautionary motive to guard against
high out-of-pocket medical costs in the United States as compared to Italy
and the Netherlands. Here, and repeatedly in subsequent analyses, we have
to oﬀer the caveat that we are not controlling for cohort eﬀects, so that the
age eﬀects we observe may be (and probably are) contaminated by cohort
eﬀects. Disentangling age and cohort eﬀects is beyond the scope of the cur-
rent study.
Since the deﬁnitions of education levels diﬀer substantially across the
three countries, all education dummies are country speciﬁc. The lowest ed-
ucation category is always the reference category. Net worth increases mo-
notonically with education in all three countries.
The eﬀect of being retired diﬀers substantially across the three countries,
with a negative eﬀect in the United States and positive eﬀects in the Nether-
lands and Italy. We should be somewhat careful in interpreting these re-
sults, as retirement status is correlated with age. In particular, the negative
eﬀect of being retired on net worth in the United States should be consid-
ered jointly with the strong positive age eﬀect on net worth, shown in ﬁg-
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Fig. 9.1 Estimated age functions in the net worth regressionsure 9.1. More important, retirement may be partly endogenous in the sense
that retirement is more likely for individuals with more wealth. Thus, the
positive sign of the retirement dummy in Italy and the Netherlands may
simply reﬂect that people with more wealth are more likely to retire. With
this interpretation, the sign of the retirement dummy in the United States
is harder to understand.
Household income has a positive inﬂuence on capital accumulation.
However, the strength of the eﬀect varies substantially across the three coun-
tries. In the Netherlands the eﬀect of income is very small and not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. In Italy and the United States it is much bigger and very sig-
niﬁcant. The discussion of the next hypothesis interprets this pattern.
Hypothesis 3: The Role of Capital Market Imperfections
The implications of the diﬀerences in capital markets in the United
States, the Netherlands, and Italy are that, ceteris paribus, Italy should
have the highest saving rate and the Netherlands the lowest. In addition,
when considering net household wealth Italy should be the country where
net wealth, as a percentage of gross wealth, should be highest. The former
implication is hard to test directly, because of other factors inﬂuencing sav-
ing rates, but the latter implication is easy to verify.
Table 9.7 shows that median solvency (net worth divided by gross
wealth) is equal to one in all three countries. The ratios of median net worth
and median gross wealth in table 9.7 are 0.81 in the United States, 0.98 in
Italy, and 0.74 in the Netherlands. Thus, for a given level of net worth Ital-
ian households borrow considerably less money than households in the
United States and the Netherlands. The weaker borrowing constraints in
the latter countries induce lower private capital accumulation.
Somewhat tentatively, we interpret the high coeﬃcient of noncapital in-
come in the wealth regressions in table 9.11 for Italy as another indication
of the relevance of borrowing constraints. Conceivably, the harder it is to
borrow money to invest in proﬁtable undertakings (e.g., real estate or
stocks), the more important income becomes as a source of capital for in-
vestment. Thus, ceteris paribus, the connection between income and wealth
accumulation would be stronger in Italy than in the United States or the
Netherlands.
Hypothesis 4: Portfolio Composition
We hypothesized that stock ownership in the Netherlands will be the
lowest among the three countries, because it has the lowest level of private
wealth. In the United States, the combination of a well-developed capital
market and a high level of private wealth for retirement purposes should
induce a relatively high level of stock ownership. Italy should be in be-
tween, because it has a relatively high level of private wealth but a less-
developed capital market. To shed light on the plausibility of these hy-
potheses, table 9.12 presents results from cross-country regressions of the
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(1) (2) (3)
Dummy HRS1992 –43.591 0.205∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.63) (2.45) (4.19)
Dummy HRS1998 –43.554 0.244∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.63) (2.92) (6.47)
Dummy SEP1992 –29.098 –0.437∗∗∗ –0.643∗∗∗
(0.42) (3.60) (7.54)














NL 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(15.32) (15.30) (14.67)
Dummy retired
US –0.000 0.001 0.001
t(0.00) (0.17) (0.17)
IT 0.075∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(4.89) (4.87) (4.95)
NL 0.031 0.047∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(1.10) (2.39) (2.50)
High school, US –0.005 –0.006 –0.006
(0.43) (0.52) (0.54)
More than high school, US 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(9.45) (9.34) (9.29)
Some high school, IT 0.085∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(5.14) (5.49) (5.80)
High school, IT 0.143∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(7.83) (8.09) (8.91)
Some college, IT 0.154∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(6.31) (6.38) (7.35)
Lower vocational/junior high, NL –0.011 –0.015 0.003
(0.33) (0.46) (0.10)
Middle vocational, NL 0.088∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(3.38) (3.22) (3.55)






No. of observations 21,447 21,445 21,344
Pseudo R2 .21 .21 .21
Notes: Dependent variables: share of risky assets in gross wealth. Absolute value of t-statistics in
parentheses. US   United States; IT   Italy; NL   the Netherlands.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.share of risky assets (stocks and bonds) in gross wealth. The approach is
similar to the approach in table 9.11. We start with separate analyses by
country and then simplify the model by imposing equality of parameters
allowed by the data. Since shares are between zero and one by construc-
tion, we use a two-limit tobit model to estimate the equation, with a lower
limit equal to zero and an upper limit equal to one.
The ﬁrst column presents estimates of the unrestricted equations. A test
for equality of the age functions across countries is far from rejection and
hence the second column imposes equal age functions. A test of equality of
the income coeﬃcients across the three countries is almost rejected at the 5
percent level (F[2,21419]  2.83, p .0590). Similarly, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the net worth coeﬃcients of the United States and Italy
areequal (F[1,21419]  2.73, p .0984) at the 5 percent level. The last col-
umn presents estimation results with these equalities imposed. Figure 9.2
sketches the estimated age function, which turns out to be fairly ﬂat in the
age range where most of the data points are.
For convenience, we restrict a discussion of table 9.12 to the last column.
Household income has a relatively small but signiﬁcant direct inﬂuence on
the share of risky assets held. Its inﬂuence is positive, which would be con-
sistent with a model where income can be used to buﬀer risks incurred by
investing in the risky assets (i.e., having a higher noncapital income reduces
background risk in some informal sense). Of course, there is also an indi-
rect eﬀect of income via its eﬀect on total net worth, as discussed with re-
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Fig. 9.2 A common age function to explain risky asset share across the 
three countriesspect to table 9.11. Net worth has a positive eﬀect on the share of risky as-
sets in all three countries, as expected.
The share of risky assets in gross wealth increases with education in all
countries (except the diﬀerence between high school and less than high
school in the United States; the diﬀerence between these two education lev-
els is not statistically signiﬁcant). This can be interpreted in at least two
diﬀerent ways: (a) owning stocks or bonds requires a certain level of knowl-
edge which is more likely to be present among the higher-educated; (b) a
higher education level reduces risks in the labor market and this reduction
in background risk makes an individual less risk-averse.
We note that the indicator for being retired is insigniﬁcant in the United
States and signiﬁcantly positive in both Italy and the Netherlands. A pos-
sible interpretation is that after retirement income and consumption risks
have essentially disappeared in Italy and the Netherlands, whereas in the
United States consumption risk associated with adverse health shocks be-
comes more important. This risk reduction after retirement in Italy and the
Netherlands would allow households to take on more risk in the stock
market.
It is tempting to interpret the country- and wave-speciﬁc dummies as
propensities to hold risky assets, after controlling for the variables listed in
table 9.12. One should note, however, that in general the values of the
dummies are sensitive to the scaling of the monetary variables. If, for in-
stance, we switch from dollars and euros to thousands of dollars and euros,
then to a good approximation all monetary variables are reduced by
ln(1,000)   6.91. Since the monetary variables have diﬀerent coeﬃcients
for diﬀerent countries, such changes in monetary units aﬀect country- and
wave-speciﬁc dummies diﬀerentially, without changing the underlying
model. The only valid comparison in table 9.12 is between Italy and the
United States in the last column, because we have restricted the coeﬃcients
of net worth and household income to be equal. We notice that the dum-
mies for the United States are signiﬁcantly positive, consistent with the no-
tion that a more developed capital market in the United States facilitates
stock and bond ownership, controlling for education, wealth, and demo-
graphics.
9.7 Conclusion
The analysis in this paper is a ﬁrst attempt at consistently exploiting in-
stitutional variation across countries to improve our understanding of
wealth accumulation and portfolio choice of households at or near retire-
ment. The number of countries considered is limited, as is the amount of de-
tail in the data that we have been able to use. The stylized facts that we are
able to glean from the microdata are certainly consistent with the hypothe-
ses that we formulated. In summary, their main implications are as follows:
Institutions and Saving for Retirement 309• Americans should save more for retirement than the Dutch or the Ital-
ians.
• Americans should save more due to more exposure to uninsurable in-
come and consumption risk.
• Italians should save more due to severe borrowing constraints in their
country.
• The Dutch should have relatively low stockholdings due to the low
level of private wealth.
• Stock ownership in the United States should be higher than in Italy be-
cause of more developed capital markets in the United States.
While each of these implications is borne out by the data, we cannot rule
out alternatives to our stochastic life-cycle framework. Further, it is in gen-
eral not possible to establish the relative magnitude of factors inﬂuencing
wealth accumulation or portfolio choice. For instance, both low replace-
ment rates at retirement and higher consumption and income risk in the
United States imply that Americans should save more than Europeans. To
further disentangle the relative eﬀect of these factors one possibility would
be to exploit variation in risk and replacement rates across individuals in
the datasets, for example, along the lines of Carroll and Samwick (1998).
However, such an approach is vulnerable to the criticism that individuals
select into occupations that are more or less risky according to their risk
preferences. Assuming that such self-selection is more diﬃcult across
countries, analyzing a substantial larger number of countries would ap-
pear to be preferable.
It is worthwhile to extend the analysis in two main directions. First, it is
very desirable to add countries to have more institutional variation that
can be exploited, as the problem of disentangling the roles of replacement
rates and risk illustrates. Yet, second, the current data can be analyzed
more extensively and more information can be brought to bear on the hy-
potheses formulated. In particular, one could exploit the longitudinal na-
ture of the data more, for example, to disentangle age and cohort eﬀects,
but also to exploit time series variation in addition to cross-sectional and
cross-country variation. This will also permit addressing such endogeneity
issues as the timing of retirement.
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This chapter provides a systematic examination of the level and composi-
tion of wealth holdings across three developed countries. It is similar in
spirit to cross-country comparisons in volumes by Poterba (1994) on sav-
ing and Gruber and Wise (1999) on retirement, in which micro-level data
from several countries were harmonized to examine a speciﬁc issue. The
analysis is organized around a set of motives for saving or stock ownership,
with predictions made for the ranking of countries based on the institu-
tions in each one. The goal of such an undertaking is to assess the validity
of each motive as a separate component of a general life-cycle model.
This objective is for all practical purposes beyond the reach of a study
that uses only macroeconomic data for each country, unless there were a
long time series on aggregate saving with exogenous changes in the institu-
tions of one country relative to the others. The use of microeconomic data
is therefore a sensible area for current research. However, the same caveat
regarding identiﬁcation applies with microeconomic data as with macro-
economic data—to what extent are the diﬀerences across subgroups of the
population due only to the institutions related to the speciﬁc motive in
question? It is in this regard that more work needs to be done in this line of
inquiry.
The authors’ results are brieﬂy summarized in table 9C.1.
The authors consider each of four savings and portfolio motives in turn:
retirement saving, based on diﬀerences in replacement rates; precaution-
ary saving, based on presumed diﬀerences in postretirement out-of-pocket
health expenditures; liquidity constraints, particularly with respect to
purchasing a home; and stock ownership, given the diﬀerences in wealth
levels that decrease the household’s aversion to holding risky assets. In
general, the authors conjecture that households in the United States face
lower replacement rates and higher postretirement uncertainty and should
therefore hold more wealth. This, along with very well-developed equity
markets, allows them to allocate more of their wealth to stock ownership.
Italian households face more severe borrowing constraints in ﬁnancial
markets, particularly related to home ownership, and thus are conjectured
to hold greater wealth to accumulate down payments or less debt relative
to their assets.
The ﬁrst hypothesis pertains to retirement saving. The authors set up a
comparison between the raw replacement rates provided by social security
and pensions and the generalized replacement rate, including the annuity
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Research.value of wealth. Table 9C.2shows the comparisons at the medians. The au-
thors’ argument receives some support—in the Netherlands, where raw re-
placement rates are highest, the annuity value of wealth accumulated pri-
vately is smaller than in the United States and Italy.
There are two important caveats to this conclusion. First, because the
comparisons are done using actual retirements that are observed during
the sample, there is a potential for sample selection to exaggerate the re-
sults. Households that have the highest replacement rates are more likely
to retire. The bias may go in either direction—depending on whether it is
the high raw replacement rate or the high annuity value of wealth that more
strongly correlates with retirement behavior. This correlation must be esti-
mated empirically for each country. Second, for Italy and the Netherlands,
sample sizes are in the hundreds (largely because the surveys are for the
whole population rather than just a cohort nearing retirement). Standard
errors should be reported to determine whether the replacement rates are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in each case.
The second hypothesis rests on the authors’ assertion that households in
the United States should save more to confront uncertainty in preretire-
ment income and old-age health expenditures. The main ﬁnding is that
Americans save more after age ﬁfty. This could be evidence in favor of pre-
cautionary saving, but it could also be due to many other factors, includ-
ing a stronger bequest motive. Much more could be done in this aspect of
the paper. Other authors examining the relationship between income un-
certainty and wealth (see, for example, Carroll and Samwick 1997) have
tested whether households in higher-risk occupations, industries, or edu-
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Table 9C.1 Relative strength of saving or portfolio motives, by country
Motive United States Italy The Netherlands
Retirement High Low Low
Uncertainty High Low Low
Liquidity constraints Low High Low
Stock ownership High Low Low
Note: Each cell reports the predicted relative amount of saving (or stock ownership) in each
country due to the speciﬁed motive based on prevailing institutions.
Table 9C.2 Raw and generalized replacement rates, by country
Motive United States Italy The Netherlands
Raw 75.7 85.9 102.3
Generalized 111.4 124.5 114.5
Notes: Each cell reports the ratio of postretirement noncapital income to preretirement in-
come. The generalized replacement rates also include the annuity value of household wealth
in the numerator.cation groups actually save more. The authors should include in their anal-
ysis proxies for the actual risks faced to determine if precautionary motives
are in fact responsible for the disparities in saving.
The third hypothesis pertains to the eﬀect of liquidity constraints on sav-
ing. In general, the possibility of being liquidity constrained in a future pe-
riod generates higher saving in the current period. The authors approach
this possibility by noting that Italy, where access to credit is more limited
than in the other countries, has the highest ratio of net wealth to total
wealth. This is also supportive of the hypothesis. One caveat to the com-
parison is that a sample of households near retirement age is not the most
eﬀective place to examine borrowing constraints, as a life-cycle model sug-
gests very little borrowing at these ages in any country. Since most of the
borrowing would occur earlier in life when the household ﬁrst attempts to
become a home owner, it would be better to make the comparison using a
sample of younger households.
The last hypothesis considers portfolio choice, based on the results of
the ﬁrst three. Since risk aversion is thought to decrease as wealth in-
creases, the higher wealth holdings in Italy and especially the United States
should lead to higher stock ownership. This conjecture is empirically veri-
ﬁed. However, there are several caveats to the interpretation. First, many
other factors that diﬀer at the country level may contribute to diﬀerent de-
grees of stock ownership. For example, Poterba and Samwick (2003) show
that marginal tax rates inﬂuence the ownership and allocation of ﬁnancial
assets in the United States. The ﬁnding that older households in the United
States hold more stock in their portfolios could reﬂect a larger capital gains
tax or estate tax preference for equities relative to the tax preferences in
other countries. Second, I disagree with the underlying assumption that
there is a single, global market for all securities—the supply of securities in
each country will inﬂuence the portfolios of that country’s households.
There is no necessary reason why the aggregate debt-equity ratio in each
country will be the same. High stock ownership in the United States may
simply reﬂect a greater supply of corporate equity relative to the other
countries. Third, in equilibrium, the holdings of a particular cohort (e.g.,
those nearing retirement) may be a passive response to the portfolio needs
of another cohort. For example, younger households in the Netherlands
may be more willing to hold stock than their contemporaries in other coun-
tries. The younger households would bid up the price of equities in the
Netherlands, causing older households to hold less stock. The authors
should take more care to control for these confounding possibilities in
making their conclusions.
Overall, the authors achieve some degree of success in exploiting varia-
tion in institutions across countries to test hypotheses about saving. Cer-
tainly nothing in the chapter suggests a reason to doubt a straightforward
stochastic life-cycle model. Future work needs to consider more carefully
Institutions and Saving for Retirement 315the other factors that inﬂuence saving at the country level to ensure that the
comparisons are truly identiﬁed.
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